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Abstract. Cooperative interval games are a generalized model of co-
operative games in which the worth of every coalition corresponds to a
closed interval representing the possible outcomes of its cooperation. Se-
lections are all possible outcomes of the interval game with no additional
uncertainty.
We introduce new selection-based classes of interval games and prove
their characterization theorems and relations to existing classes based
on the interval weakly better operator. We show new results regarding
the core and imputations and examine a problem of equivalence for two
different versions of the core, the main stability solution of cooperative
games. Finally, we introduce the definition of strong imputation and
strong core as universal solution concepts of interval games.
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1 Introduction
Uncertainty and inaccurate data are issues occurring very often in real-world
situations. Therefore it is important to be able to make decisions even when the
exact data are not available and some bounds on them are known.
In classical cooperative game theory, every group of players (coalition) knows
the precise reward for their cooperation; in cooperative interval games, only the
worst and the best possible outcome are known. Such situations can be naturally
modeled with intervals encapsulating these outcomes. This model is especially
useful if we have no additional assumption on probability distribution on this
interval. In some sense, cooperative interval games get the best of both worlds.
We count in all the possible outcomes, yet our model is sufficiently simple to
analyze.
Cooperation under interval uncertainty was first considered by Branzei, Dim-
itrov and Tijs in 2003 to study bankruptcy situations [10] and later further ex-
tensively studied by Alparslan Go¨k in her Ph.D. thesis [1] and in other papers
written together with Branzei et al. (see references in [9]).
However, their approach is almost exclusively aimed at interval solutions,
that is on payoff distributions consisting of intervals and thus containing yet
another uncertainty. This is in contrast with selections – possible outcomes of an
interval game with no additional uncertainty. The selection- based approach was
never systematically studied and not very much is known. This paper is trying
to fix this and summarizes our results regarding the selection-based approach to
interval games.
The paper has the following structure. Section 2 is a preliminary section that
presents necessary definitions and facts on classical cooperative games, interval
analysis, and cooperative interval games. Section 3 is devoted to new selection-
based classes of interval games. We consequently prove their characterizations
and relations to existing classes. Section 4 focuses on the so-called core incidence
problem which asks under which conditions are the selection core and the set
of payoffs generated by the interval core equal. In Section 5, the definitions of
strong core and strong imputation are introduced as new concepts. We show
some simple results on the strong core, one of them being a characterization
of games with the strong imputation and strong core. Finally, we conclude this
paper with a summary of our results and possible directions for future research.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 On mathematical notation
– We will use ≤ relation on real vectors. For every x, y ∈ RN we write x ≤ y if
xi ≤ yi holds for every 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
– We do not use symbol ⊂ in this paper. Instead, ⊆ and ( are used for subset
and proper subset, respectively, to avoid ambiguity.
2.2 Classical cooperative game theory
Comprehensive sources on classical cooperative game theory are for example
[11,14,15,18]. For more information on applications, see e.g. [8,13,16]. Here we
present only necessary background theory for studying interval games. We ex-
amine games with transferable utility (TU) and therefore by a cooperative game
we mean a cooperative TU game.
Definition 1. (Cooperative game) A cooperative game is an ordered pair (N, v),
where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a set of players and v : 2N → R is a characteristic
function of the cooperative game. We further assume that v(∅) = 0.
The set of all cooperative games with a player set N is denoted by GN .
Subsets of N are called coalitions and N itself is called the grand coalition.
We often write v instead of (N, v), because we can easily identify a game
with its characteristic function without loss of generality.
To further analyze players’ gains, we will need a payoff vector which can be
interpreted as a proposed distribution of rewards between players.
Definition 2. (Payoff vector) A payoff vector for a cooperative game (N, v) is
a vector x ∈ RN with xi denoting the reward given to the ith player.
Definition 3. (Imputation) An imputation of (N, v) ∈ GN is a vector x ∈ RN
such that
∑
i∈N xi = v(N) and xi ≥ v({i}) for every i ∈ N .
The set of all imputations of a given cooperative game (N, v) is denoted by
I(v).
Definition 4. (Core) The core of (N, v) ∈ GN is the set
C(v) =
{
x ∈ I(v);
∑
i∈S
xi ≥ v(S), ∀S ⊆ N
}
.
There are many important classes of cooperative games. Here we show the
most important ones.
Definition 5. (Monotonic game) A game (N, v) is monotonic if for every T ⊆
S ⊆ N we have
v(T ) ≤ v(S).
Informally, in monotonic games, bigger coalitions are stronger.
Definition 6. (Superadditive game) A game (N, v) is superadditive if for every
S, T ⊆ N , S ∩ T = ∅ we have
v(T ) + v(S) ≤ v(S ∪ T ).
In a superadditive game, a coalition has no incentive to divide itself since
together they will always achieve at least as much as separated.
Superadditive games are not necessarily monotonic. Conversely, monotonic
games are not necessarily superadditive. However, these classes have a nonempty
intersection. Check Caulier’s paper [12] for more details on the relationship be-
tween these two classes.
Definition 7. (Additive game) A game (N, v) is additive if for every S, T ⊆ N ,
S ∩ T = ∅ we have
v(T ) + v(S) = v(S ∪ T ).
Observe that additive games are superadditive as well.
Another important type of game is a convex game.
Definition 8. (Convex game) A game (N, v) is convex if its characteristic func-
tion is supermodular. The characteristic function is supermodular if for every
S ⊆ T ⊆ N ,
v(T ) + v(S) ≤ v(S ∪ T ) + v(S ∩ T ).
Clearly, supermodularity implies superadditivity.
Convex games have many nice properties. We remind the most important
one.
Theorem 1. (Shapley 1971 [20]) If a game (N, v) is convex, then its core is
nonempty.
2.3 Interval analysis
Definition 9. (Interval) An interval X is a set
X := [X,X] = {x ∈ R : X ≤ x ≤ X}.
with X being the lower bound and X being the upper bound of the interval.
From now on, by an interval, we mean a closed interval. The set of all real
intervals is denoted by IR.
The following definition (from [17]) shows how to do basic arithmetics with
intervals.
Definition 10. For every X,Y, Z ∈ IR and 0 /∈ Z define
X + Y := [X + Y ,X + Y ],
X − Y := [X − Y ,X − Y ],
X · Y := [minS,maxS], S = {XY ,XY ,XY ,XY },
X /Z := [minS,maxS], S = {X/Z,X/Z,X/Z,X/Z}.
2.4 Cooperative interval games
This section aims at presenting results on cooperative interval games necessary
to grasp our contribution to theory.
Definition 11. (Cooperative interval game) A cooperative interval game is an
ordered pair (N,w), where N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is a set of players and w : 2N → IR
is the characteristic function of the cooperative game. We further assume that
w(∅) = [0, 0].
The set of all interval cooperative games on a player set N is denoted by
IGN .
We often write w(i) instead of w({i}).
Remark 1. Each cooperative interval game in which the characteristic function
maps to degenerate intervals only can be associated with some classical cooper-
ative game. The converse holds as well.
Definition 12. (Border games) For every (N,w) ∈ IGN , border games (N,w) ∈
GN (lower border game) and (N,w) ∈ GN (upper border game) are given by
w(S) = w(S) and w(S) = w(S) for every S ∈ 2N .
Definition 13. (Length game) The length game of (N,w) ∈ IGN is the game
(N, |w|) ∈ GN with
|w|(S) = w(S)− w(S), ∀S ∈ 2N .
The basic notion of our approach will be a selection and consequently a
selection imputation and a selection core.
Definition 14. (Selection) A game (N, v) ∈ GN is a selection of (N,w) ∈ IGN
if for every S ∈ 2N we have v(S) ∈ w(S). Set of all selections of (N,w) is
denoted by Sel(w).
Note that border games are particular examples of selections.
Definition 15. (Interval selection imputation) The set of interval selection im-
putations (or just selection imputations) of (N,w) ∈ IGN is defined as
SI(w) =
⋃{
I(v) | v ∈ Sel(w)
}
.
Definition 16. (Interval selection core) The interval selection core (or just se-
lection core) of (N,w) ∈ IGN is defined as
SC(w) =
⋃{
C(v) | v ∈ Sel(w)
}
.
Alparslan Go¨k [1] choose an approach using a weakly better operator. That
was inspired by [19].
Definition 17. (Weakly better operator ) Interval I is weakly better than
interval J (I  J) if I ≥ J and I ≥ J . Furthermore, I  J if and only if I ≤ J
and I ≤ J . Interval I is better than J (I ≻ J) if and only if I  J and I 6= J .
Their definition of imputation and core is as follows.
Definition 18. (Interval imputation) The set of interval imputations of (N,w) ∈
IGN is defined as
I(w) :=
{
(I1, I2, . . . , IN ) ∈ IR
N |
∑
i∈N
Ii = w(N), Ii  w(i), ∀i ∈ N
}
.
Definition 19. (Interval core) An interval core of (N,w) ∈ IGN is defined as
C(w) :=
{
(I1, I2, . . . , IN ) ∈ I(w) |
∑
i∈S
Ii  w(S), ∀S ∈ 2
N \ {∅}
}
.
An important difference between the definitions of interval and selection core
and imputation is that selection concepts yield payoff vectors from RN , while I
and C yield vectors from IRN .
(Notation) Throughout the papers on cooperative interval games, notation,
especially of core and imputations, is not unified. It is, therefore, possible to
encounter different notation from ours.
Also, in these papers, the selection core is called the core of interval game. We
consider that confusing and that is why we use the term selection core instead.
The term selection imputation is used because of its connection with the selection
core.
The following classes of interval games have been studied earlier (see e.g. [2]).
Definition 20. (Size monotonicity) A game (N,w) ∈ IGN is size monotonic if
for every T ⊆ S ⊆ N we have
|w|(T ) ≤ |w|(S).
That is, its length game is monotonic.
The class of size monotonic games on a player set N is denoted by SMIGN .
As we can see, size monotonic games capture situations in which an interval
uncertainty grows with the size of a coalition.
Definition 21. (Superadditive interval game) A game (N,w) ∈ IGN is a su-
peradditive interval game if for every S, T ⊆ N , S ∩ T = ∅,
w(T ) + w(S)  w(S ∪ T ),
and its length game is superadditive. We denote by SIGN the class of superad-
ditive interval games on a player set N .
We should be careful with the following analogy of a convex game since unlike
for classical games, supermodularity is not the same as convexity.
Definition 22. (Supermodular interval game) An interval game (N,w) is su-
permodular interval if for every S ⊆ T ⊆ N holds
w(T ) + v(S)  w(S ∪ T ) + w(S ∩ T ).
We get immediately that an interval game is supermodular interval if and
only if its border games are convex.
Definition 23. (Convex interval game) An interval game (N,w) is convex in-
terval if its border games and length game are convex.
We write CIGN for a set of convex interval games on a player set N .
A convex interval game is supermodular as well but the converse does not hold
in general. See [2] for characterizations of convex interval games and discussion
on their properties.
3 Selection-based classes of interval games
We will now introduce new classes of interval games based on the properties of
their selections. We think that it is a natural way to generalize special classes
from classical cooperative game theory. Consequently, we show their characteri-
zations and relation to classes from the preceding section.
Definition 24. (Selection monotonic interval game) An interval game (N, v) is
selection monotonic if all its selections are monotonic games. The class of such
games on a player set N is denoted by SeMIGN .
Definition 25. (Selection superadditive interval game) An interval game (N, v)
is selection superadditive if all its selections are superadditive games. The class
of such games on a player set N is denoted by SeSIGN .
Definition 26. (Selection convex interval game) An interval game (N, v) is
selection convex if all its selections are convex games. The class of such games
on a player set N is denoted by SeCIGN .
We see that many properties persist. For example, a selection convex game is
a selection superadditive as well. Selection monotonic and selection superadditive
are not subsets of each other but their intersection is nonempty. Furthermore, the
selection core of selection convex game is nonempty, which is an easy observation.
We will now show characterizations of these three classes and consequently
show their relations to the existing classes presented in Section 2.4.
Theorem 2. An interval game (N,w) is selection monotonic if and only if for
every S, T ∈ 2N , S ( T
w(S) ≤ w(T ).
Proof. For the “only if” part, suppose that (N,w) is a selection monotonic
and w(S) > w(T ) for some S, T ∈ 2N , S ( T . Then selection (N, v) with
v(S) = w(S) and v(T ) = w(T ) clearly violates monotonicity and we arrive at a
contradiction.
Now for the “if” part. For any two subsets S, T of N , one of the situations
S ( T , T ( S or S = T occurs. For S = T , in every selection v, v(S) ≤ v(S)
holds. As for the other two situations, it is obvious that monotonicity cannot be
violated as well since v(S) ≤ w(S) ≤ w(T ) ≤ v(T ). ⊓⊔
Notice the importance of using S ( T in the formulation of Theorem 2.
That is because using of S ⊆ T (thus allowing situation S = T ) would imply
w(S) ≤ w(S) for every S in selection monotonic game which is obviously not true
in general. In characterizations of selection superadditive and selection convex
games, a similar situation arises.
Theorem 3. An interval game (N,w) is selection superadditive if and only if
for every S, T ∈ 2N such that S ∩ T = ∅, S 6= ∅, T 6= ∅
w(S) + w(T ) ≤ w(S ∪ T ).
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 2. ⊓⊔
We give a characterization of selection convex games as well:
Theorem 4. An interval game (N,w) is selection convex if and only if for every
S, T ∈ 2N such that S 6⊆ T , T 6⊆ S, S 6= ∅, T 6= ∅ holds
w(S) + w(T ) ≤ w(S ∪ T ) + w(S ∩ T ).
Proof. Similar to proof of Proposition 2.
Now let us look at a relation with existing classes of interval games.
For selection monotonic and size monotonic games, their relation is obvious.
For nontrivial games, i.e. games with the size of player set greater than one, a
selection monotonic game is not necessarily size monotonic and vice versa.
Theorem 5. For every player set N with |N | > 1, the following assertions hold.
(i) SeSIGN 6⊆ SIGN .
(ii) SIGN 6⊆ SeSIGN .
(iii) SeSIGN ∩ SIGN 6= ∅.
Proof. In (i), we can construct the counterexample in the following way.
Let us construct game (N,w). For w(∅), the interval is given. Now for any
nonempty coalition, set w(S) := [2|S| − 2, 2|S| − 1]. For any S, T ∈ 2N with
S and T being nonempty and disjoint, the following holds with the fact that
|S|+ |T | = |S ∪ T | taken into account.
w(S) + w(T ) = (2|S| − 1) + (2|T | − 1)
= 2|S ∪ T | − 2
= w(S ∪ T )
So (N,w) is selection superadditive by Theorem 3. Its length game, however, is
not superadditive since for any two nonempty coalitions with empty intersection
|w|(S) + |w|(T ) = 2 6≤ 1 = |w|(S ∪ T ) holds.
In (ii), we can construct the following counterexample (N,w′). Set w′(S) =
[0, |S|] for any nonempty S. The lower border game is trivially superadditive.
For the upper game, w′(S) + w′(T ) = |S| + |T | = |S ∪ T | = w′(S ∪ T ) for
any S, T with empty intersection, so the upper game is superadditive. Observe
that the length game is the same as the upper border game. This shows interval
superadditivity.
However, (N,w′) is clearly not selection superadditive because of nonzero
upper bounds, zero lower bounds of nonempty coalitions and the characterization
of SeSIGN taken into account.
(iii) Nonempty intersection can be argued easily by taking some superaddi-
tive game (N, c) ∈ GN . Then we can define corresponding game (N, d) ∈ IGN
with
d(S) = [c(S), c(S)], ∀S ∈ 2N .
Game (N, d) is selection superadditive since its only selection is (N, c). And it
is superadditive interval game since border games are supermodular and length
game is |w|(S) = 0 for every coalition, which trivially implies its superadditivity.
⊓⊔
Theorem 6. For every player set N with |N | > 1, the following assertions hold.
(i) SeCIGN 6⊆ CIGN .
(ii) CIGN 6⊆ SeCIGN .
(iii) SeCIGN ∩ CIGN 6= ∅.
Proof. For (i), take a game (N,w) assigning to each nonempty coalition S in-
terval [2|S| − 2, 2|S| − 1]. From Theorem 4, we get that for inequalities which
must hold in order to meet necessary conditions of game to be selection convex,
|S| < |S ∪ T | and |T | < |S ∪ T | must hold. That gives the following inequality:
w(S) + w(T ) ≤ (2|S∪T |−1 − 1) + (2|S∪T |−1 − 1)
= 2|S∪T | − 2
= w(S ∪ T )
≤ w(S ∪ T ) + w(S ∩ T )
This concludes that (N,w) is selection convex. We see that the border games
and the length game are convex too. To have a game so that it is selection convex
and not convex interval, we can take (N, c) and set c(S) := w(S) for S 6= N
and c(N) := [w(N), w(N)]. Now the game (N, c) is still selection convex, but
its length game is not convex and (N, v) is not a convex interval game, which is
what we wanted.
In (ii), we can take a game (N,w′) from the proof of Theorem 5(ii). From
the fact that |S| + |T | = |S ∪ T | + |S ∩ T |, it is clear that w′ is convex. The
lower border game is trivially convex and the length game is the same as upper.
However, for nonempty S, T ∈ 2N such that S 6⊆ T , T 6⊆ S, S 6= ∅, T 6= ∅,
convex selection games characterization is clearly violated.
As for (iii), we can use the same steps as in (iii) of Theorem 5 or we can use
a game (N,w) from (i) of this theorem. ⊓⊔
4 Core coincidence
In Alparslan-Go¨k’s PhD thesis [1] and [7], the following question is suggested:
“A difficult topic might be to analyze under which conditions the set
of payoff vectors generated by the interval core of a cooperative interval
game coincides with the core of the game in terms of selections of the
interval game.”
We decided to examine this topic. We call it the core coincidence problem.
This section shows our results.
We remind the reader that whenever we talk about a relation and maximum,
minimum, maximal, minimal vectors, we mean the relation ≤ on real vectors
unless we say otherwise.
The main thing to notice is that while the interval core gives us a set of
interval vectors, selection core gives us a set of real numbered vectors. To be
able to compare them, we need to assign to a set of interval vectors a set of real
vectors generated by these interval vectors. That is exactly what the following
function gen does.
Definition 27. The function gen : 2IR
N
→ 2R
N
maps to every set of interval
vectors a set of real vectors. It is defined as
gen(S) =
⋃
s∈S
{
(x1, x2, . . . , xn) | xi ∈ si
}
.
The core coincidence problem can be formulated as this: What are the nec-
essary and sufficient conditions to satisfy gen(C(w)) = SC(w)?
The main results of this section are two theorems which can be seen as a
partial step towards an answer to the core coincidence problem.
In the following text by mixed system, we mean a system of equalities and
inequalities.
Theorem 7. For every interval game (M,w) we have gen(C(w)) ⊆ SC(w).
Proof. For any x ∈ gen(C(w)), the inequality w(N) ≤
∑
i∈N xi ≤ w(N) obvi-
ously holds. Furthermore, x is in the core for any selection of the interval game
(N, s) with s given by
s(S) =
{[∑
i∈N xi,
∑
i∈N xi
]
if S = N,[
w(S),min(
∑
i∈S xi, w(S))
]
otherwise.
Clearly, Sel(s) ⊆ Sel(w) and Sel(s) 6= ∅. Therefore gen(C(w)) ⊆ SC(w). ⊓⊔
Theorem 8. (Core coincidence characterization) For every interval game (N,w)
we have gen(C(w)) = SC(w) if and only if for every x ∈ SC(w) there exist non-
negative vectors l(x) and u(x) such that∑
i∈N
(xi − l
(x)
i ) = w(N), (4.1)
∑
i∈N
(xi + u
(x)
i ) = w(N), (4.2)
∑
i∈S
(xi − l
(x)
i ) ≥ w(S), ∀S ∈ 2
N \ {∅}, (4.3)
∑
i∈S
(xi + u
(x)
i ) ≥ w(S), ∀S ∈ 2
N \ {∅}. (4.4)
Proof. First, we observe that with Theorem 7 taken into account, we only need
to take care of gen(C(w)) ⊇ SC(w) to obtain equality.
For gen(C(w)) ⊇ SC(w), suppose we have some x ∈ SC(w). For this vector,
we need to find some interval X ∈ C(w) such that x ∈ gen(X). This is equivalent
to the task of finding two nonnegative vectors l(x) and u(x) such that
([x1 − l
(x)
1 , x1 + u
(x)
1 ]), [x2 − l
(x)
2 , x2 + u
(x)
2 ], . . . , [xn − l
(x)
n , xn + u
(x)
n ]) ∈ C(w).
From the definition of interval core, we can see that these two vectors have to
satisfy exactly the mixed system (4.1)− (4.4). That completes the proof. ⊓⊔
Example 1. Consider an interval game with N = {1, 2} and w({1}) = w({2}) =
[1, 3] and w(N) = [1, 4]. Then vector (2, 2) lies in the core of the selection with
v({1}) = v({2}) = 2 and v(N) = 4. However, to satisfy equation (4.1), we need
to have
∑
i∈N li = 3 which means that either l1 or l2 has to be greater than 1.
That means we cannot satisfy (4.3) and we conclude that gen(C(w)) 6= SC(w).
The following theorem shows that it suffices to check only minimal and max-
imal vectors of SC(w).
Theorem 9. For every interval game (N,w), if there exist vectors q, r, x ∈ RN
such that q, r ∈ gen(C(w)) and qi ≤ xi ≤ ri for every i ∈ N , then x ∈ gen(C(w)).
Proof. Let l(r), u(r), l(q), u(q) be the corresponding vectors in sense of Theorem
8. We need to find vectors l(x) and u(x) satisfying (4.1)− (4.4) of Theorem 8.
Let’s define vectors dq, dr ∈ RN :
dqi = xi − qi,
dri = ri − xi.
Finally, we define l(x) and u(x) in this way:
l
(x)
i = dqi + l
(q)
i ,
u
(x)
i = dri + u
(r)
i .
We need to check that we satisfy (4.1) − (4.4) for x, l(x) and u(x) We will
show only (4.2) since remaining ones can be done in a similar way.∑
i∈N
(xi − l
(x)
i ) =
∑
i∈N
(xi − dqi − l
(q)
i )
=
∑
i∈N
(xi − xi + qi − l
(q)
i )
=
∑
i∈N
(qi − l
(q)
i )
= w(N).
⊓⊔
For games with additive border games (see Definition 7) we get the following
result.
Theorem 10. For an interval game (N,w) with additive border games, the pay-
off vector (w(1), w(2), . . . , w(n)) ∈ gen(C(w)).
Proof. First, let us look at an arbitrary additive game (A, vA). From additivity
condition and the fact that we can write any subset of A as a union of one-player
sets we conclude that vA(A) =
⋃
i∈A vA({i}) for every coalition A. This implies
that vector a with ai = vA({i}) is in the core.
This argument can be applied to border games of (N,w). The vector q ∈ RN
with qi = w(i) is an element of the core of (N,w) and an element of SC(w).
For the vector q we want to satisfy the mixed system (4.1)-(4.4) of Theorem
8.
Take the vector l containing zeros only and the vector u with ui = |w|(i).
From the additivity, we get that
∑
i∈N qi− li = w(N) and
∑
i∈N qi+ui = w(N).
Additivity further implies that inequalities (4.3) and (4.4) hold for q, l and
u. Therefore, q is an element of gen(C(w)). ⊓⊔
Theorem 10 implies that for games with additive border games, we need to
check the existence of vectors l and u from (4.1)−(4.4) of Theorem 8 for maximal
vectors of SC only. That follows from the fact that for any vector y ∈ SC(w) holds
(w(1), w(2), . . . , w(n)) ≤ y. In other words, (w(1), w(2), . . . , w(n)) is a minimum
vector of SC(w).
5 Strong imputation and core
In this section, our focus will be on a new concept of strong imputation and
strong core.
Definition 28. (Strong imputation) For a game (N,w) ∈ IGN a strong impu-
tation is a vector x ∈ RN such that x is an imputation for every selection of
(N,w).
Definition 29. (Strong core) For a game (N,w) ∈ IGN the strong core is a
set of vectors x ∈ RN such that x is an element of the core of every selection of
(N,w).
Strong imputation and strong core can be considered as somewhat “univer-
sal” solutions. We show the following three simple facts about the strong core.
Theorem 11. For every interval game with nonempty strong core, w(N) is a
degenerate interval.
Proof. The theorem follows easily by the fact that an element c of strong core
must be efficient for every selection and therefore
∑
i∈N ci = w(N) = w(N). ⊓⊔
This leads us to a characterization of games with nonempty strong core.
Theorem 12. An interval game (N,w) has a nonempty strong core if and only
if w(N) is a degenerate interval and the upper game w has a nonempty core.
Proof. The theorem follows from a combination of Theorem 11 and the fact that
an element c of the strong core has to satisfy
∑
i∈S ci ≥ v(S), ∀v ∈ Sel(w), ∀S ∈
2N \ ∅. We see that this fact is equivalent to condition
∑
i∈S ci ≥ w(S), ∀S ∈
2N \ ∅. Proving an equivalence is then straightforward. ⊓⊔
We observe that we can easily derive a characterization of games with a
nonempty strong imputation set.
The strong core also has the following important property.
Theorem 13. For every element c of the strong core of (N,w), c ∈ gen(C(w)).
Proof. The vector c has to satisfy mixed system (4.1)-(4.4) of Theorem 8 for
some l, u ∈ IRN . We show that li = ui = 0 will achieve this.
Equations (4.1) and (4.2) are satisfied by taking Theorem 11 into account.
Inequalities (4.3) and (4.4) are satisfied as the consequence of Theorem 12. ⊓⊔
The reason behind the using of name strong core and strong imputation
comes from interval linear algebra, where strong solutions of an interval system
are solutions for any realization (selection) of interval matricesA and b in Ax = b.
One could ask why we do not introduce a strong game as a game in which each
of its selection has an nonempty core. This is because such games are already
defined as strongly balanced games (see e.g. [4]).
6 Concluding remarks
Selections of an interval game are very important since they do not contain
any additional uncertainty. On the top of that, selection-based classes and the
strong core and imputation have the crucial property that although we deal with
uncertain data, all possible outcomes preserve important properties. In case of
selection classes it is preserving superadditivity, supermodularity etc. In case
of the strong core it is an invariant of having particular stable payoffs in each
selection. Furthermore, “weak” concepts like SC are important as well since if
SC is empty, no selection has a stable payoff.
The importance of studying selection-based classes instead of the existing
classes using  operator can be further illustrated by the following two facts:
– Classes based on weakly better operator may contain games with selections
that do not have any link with the defining property of their border games and
consequently no link with the name of the class. For example, superadditive
interval games may contain a selection that is not superadditive.
– Selection-based classes are not contained in corresponding classes based on
weakly better operator. Therefore, the results on existing classes are not di-
rectly extendable to selection-based classes.
Our results provide an important tool for handling cooperative situations
involving interval uncertainty which is a very common situation in various OR
problems. Some specific applications of interval games were already examined.
See [3,5,6] for applications to mountain situations, airport games, and forest
situations, respectively. However, these papers do not use a selection-based ap-
proach and therefore to study implications of our approach to them can be a
theme for future research.
To further study properties of selection-based classes is a possible topic. One
of the directions could be to introduce strictly selection convex games or decom-
posable games and examine them. Another fruitful direction can be extending of
the definition of stable set to interval games using selections. For example, one
could look at a union or an intersection of stable sets for each selection. Studying
Shapley value and other concepts in interval games context may be interesting
as well. Some of these problems are work in progress.
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